Sun, 01/07/2012 - 10:32        
Many Egyptians have not 
yet sobered from the ecstasy of finally getting a civilian president, 
for the first time in the history of the 60-year-old republic.
But only a few days after the 
announcement of Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate Mohamed 
Morsy’s victory, signs point to a less-than-perfect picture, in which 
the old regime’s rules still persist.
Despite the showdown between 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Brotherhood in the 
months preceding the election, Morsy’s victory reveals a new phase of 
political arrangements between the two. For one, they have already come 
to a decision on how to split control over government institutions, said
 Essam Haddad, a Morsy aide.
According to Haddad, an 
initial agreement entails that the army will maintain control over its 
budget and internal affairs but will not intervene in the assembly 
charged with drafting the country’s new constitution.
An anonymous source told 
Al-Masry Al-Youm that the Brotherhood will be in charge of the 
ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs but will be required to keep 
away from the Defense, Interior and Justice ministries.
The amicable agreement between
 the military council and the Brotherhood would confine the Islamist 
group’s authority to these institutions, and safeguard the SCAF from 
being sidelined by a non-allied president.
“We are indeed in negotiations with the military council,” said Sobhi Saleh, a leading Brotherhood figure.
However, the arrangement 
plants a ticking time bomb that could jeopardize Morsy’s presidency, 
once he and his group seek to expand their powers.
Bahey el-Din Hassan, director 
of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, said the two sides had 
clearly come to an agreement.
“Morsy’s victory is not just 
based on getting the majority of votes, but also on a power-sharing 
agreement that took place with the SCAF, in which the military will 
maintain its control over the national security ministries and 
institutions, including defense, police, intelligence and justice,” 
Hassan said.
But Morsy may have had few 
other options. “At least for now, Morsy has little choice but to agree 
to these conditions or he might lose everything, especially with the 
existence of the supplementary constitutional declaration,” Hassan said.
Only a few days before the 
election, the ruling military council added an addendum to the 
Constitutional Declaration that has governed Egypt since March 2011. The
 declaration limits the powers of the president and adds to those of the
 military council, with respect to the state budget, 
constitution-writing assembly and the ability to declare war, for which 
the president must first obtain approval from the military council. The 
document also takes away from Morsy the title of commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces.
But a power-sharing agreement 
with the military would be a de facto continuation of the old regime 
which, since 1952, has seen a clear split between so-called service and 
sovereign ministries. Sovereign ministries are usually related to 
national security, and they are the ones the Brotherhood is expected to 
cede.
Morsy and his group have 
changed their rhetoric toward the SCAF since his victory and after 
vehement criticism over the last few weeks. In his first national 
address on Sunday, Morsy thanked the armed forces for their efforts 
during the transition. Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the head of the 
military council, met with Morsy on Tuesday and said the military would 
stand with the incoming president.
“Morsy and his campaign are 
pragmatic. They don’t want a showdown at this moment — it’s not part of 
their makeup. They want gradual change and they want to be true to the 
revolution at the same time,” said Maha Azzam, an associate fellow with 
the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House and an 
expert on Islamist groups in Egypt.
Security
Since winning the election, 
Morsy has been making the rounds of government institutions, looking to 
iron out differences and shore up his presidency by building working 
partnerships with government institutions that may have been loath to 
the idea of working under an Islamist.
On Monday, he met with the 
High Council of Police to discuss public security and assure senior 
officials that he would not take revenge against them for past 
transgressions against his fellow Brothers. He shook hands with a member
 of the High Council of Police, once his jailer in 2006.
Morsy, a longtime leading 
Brotherhood figure, was twice imprisoned for participating in protests, 
first over judiciary independence in 2006, and on 28 January last year, 
during the 18-day uprising.
The Brotherhood itself spent 
the majority of its 84-year existence as a banned group, subject to an 
array of security clampdowns and mass arrests by a police force that was
 taught to treat the group with suspicion and often resorted to brutal 
tactics to suppress its members. The desire for revenge is not 
inconceivable for some.
Yet the Brotherhood and its 
Freedom and Justice Party have been displaying a strong tendency toward 
political pragmatism instead of dogmatic ideology, observers said.
“There’s a general agreement 
in the FJP and the Morsy campaign to open a new page with all groups and
 institutions. We understand why some may have a misconception of us, 
our history and our work on the ground, and we will work on changing 
that,” Ali Batteekh, another leading Brotherhood figure and a former MP,
 told Egypt Independent.
But while no significant 
clashes are expected to ensue between Morsy and the security apparatus, 
obtaining full control over it would require an element of purging.
“He will have to get rid of 
some of the Interior Ministry figureheads to get a better grip on the 
police,” said Mohamed Mahfouz, a former police officer and a founding 
member of the Honorable Police Officers Coalition. Mahfouz believes 
garnering loyalty from the rest of the police will not pose a 
significant problem.
“The Police Academy teaches 
obedience to power. Even if you put a monkey on the throne, they would 
obey him,” said Mahfouz. He said cadets in the Police Academy were also 
taught to look at all political groups with disdain, not just the 
Brotherhood.
Media
Other institutions, such as 
the state media, have traditionally been anti-Brotherhood. Yet their 
modus operandi is to pay allegiance to whoever is in power, a fact 
demonstrated by how quickly they changed their long reverence to Hosni 
Mubarak once the ruling military council took his position in February 
2011.
Today, questions still loom 
over whether the state-owned media is ideologically opposed to Islamists
 in a way that could entail a Mubarak-style grip over them.
“There was a vicious media 
campaign to tarnish the image of Islamists. They played a big part in 
political polarization in the recent period by propagating the failure 
of the Brotherhood in Parliament,” said Shahira Amin, a state TV 
presenter.
State media has been under the
 control of the military authorities, which will seek to maintain it, 
Amin said. “The state media loyalty will probably remain to the SCAF. 
It’s in their interest to maintain the status quo, which might 
jeopardize Morsy’s presidency,” she added.
The future
While the current word is on 
Morsy ceding “sovereign” powers to the ruling generals, this doesn’t 
necessarily reflect the ultimate ambitions of the Brotherhood, said 
Mohamed Menza, an associate professor of political science at the 
American University in Cairo.
“They have been [splitting 
power] in their favor since before the election,” said Menza, referring 
to what he said was negotiations by the Brotherhood to secure a quota 
for its members in the police force.
Menza said the SCAF would not 
relinquish its control over these institutions, and that if Morsy and 
the Brotherhood attempted to control them, the council would use its 
control of the Defense and Interior ministries to suppress them.
“If Morsy ruled with the goal 
of maximizing the Brotherhood’s members in state institutions, and not 
seeking genuine reform based on meritocracy and democratic principles, 
it would lead to the failure of his Renaissance Project and the end of 
the Brotherhood,” he added, referring to Morsy’s electoral platform.
For others, like the 
Brotherhood’s Batteekh, controlling government institutions is not the 
main priority. “I think our main issue is the process of bringing 
forward a new Parliament or settling a new constitution. I see that as 
the biggest impediment to Morsy having a successful presidency,” he 
said.
 
 
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